Economic evaluation of palliative interventions poses some challenges, both for palliative medicine and for economics. The relief of suffering and the improvement of quality of life are goals that need to be compared to other calls on health care resources. But the appropriate evaluation of palliative care brings some interesting problems and challenges for economists.
There are many misconceptions about the findings of economic evaluation studies. In general, the services that are shown to be most cost-effective are those that achieve a lot for a little. The ones that do badly are those that achieve little, despite heroic effort and significant cost. In assessing the impact of an intervention it is not the scale of the problems that is most important, but rather the capacity of the intervention to do anything useful. Economists focus on the size of solutions, and not the size of problems. Treatment of people with established disease is often more cost-effective than primary prevention, and treatment of older people is often preferable to treatment of younger people.' Early studies showed good results for hip replacements, and poorer ones for dialysis.2 Interventions that improve quality of life are often preferred to those that extend life. Careful analysis of costs and achievements often shows that the apparently simple, undramatic and unglamorous is often to be preferred. It is simply not the case that economic evaluation brings a bias in favour of the young and the use of dramatic treatment; more often it supports interventions which bring improved quality of life rather than elimination of disease, and which help relatively old and relatively sick people.
It is important for at least two reasons for palliative interventions to be routinely subjected to economic evaluation. First, in the contest for resources it is important to be able to argue the case on equal terms. It is no longer adequate to argue for special treatment based on some inherent worth of the services. Failure to subject interventions to evaluation of costs and benefits will lead to ever weaker arguments in the contest for ever scarcer resources. It is, in contrast, likely that economic evaluation will bring significant support to many palliative treatments. Secondly, and equally important, economic evaluation can allow more serious comparison between palliative interventions. Services that can be shown to be relatively ineffective and costly can be replaced by those that achieve more for less. It is always difficult to accept that popular and long established practices are not cost-effective, but if this is the case they should be stopped. No-one favours using scarce resources wastefully. Some useful starts have been made in calculating costs of palliative interventions. 1,4 However, most evaluation in the palliative care literature, and indeed in this journal, looks only at benefits and effectiveness, and not at the cost of achieving the benefits. This means that there is an inadequate basis for comparison between palliative treatments, and for assessing the priority of palliative care.
However, further work is needed on methods of collecting both costs and benefits in palliative medicine. In particular there is a need to give much more thought to the issues around assessment of benefits. There are two particular problems that need to be addressed. First, the benefits of good palliative interventions are often very large and very short lived. This means that the difference between the quality of life with and without the treatment can be huge. This difference may be from a state considerably worse than death, to one in which there is some good quality life. In principle this can be compared to benefits that are less intense for longer, but it is not easy to do so. Secondly, some of the benefits of good palliative care come in the form of reassurance to those who do not, but may come to need care. Valuing the reassurance that there will be effective and appropriate management of, for example, severe pain or serious disability can provide great reassurance, even if the likely outcome for most people is that it will not be needed. There are important issues in the valuation of reassurance, of contingent services and of benefits that are located in particular diseases and contexts.' Where a disease is progressive there is plenty of time to contemplate the different stages, and to enjoy the reassurance that appropriate steps will be taken to manage the symptoms. To concentrate only on the short spell in which intervention takes place is to ignore important benefits.
Palliative care has nothing to fear from sensible and sensitive application of economic evaluation. Services which achieve relatively little, and where this achievement fails to justify the cost are, and should be, at risk. Where interventions can be shown to be cost-effective they can gain priority over other services. However, as economic ideas are increasingly applied in this context they need to grow and develop, and adapt to the new issues and challenges. Charles Normand, Professor of Health Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK
